

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 114752

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING REPEAT SECTO 4113 ACTION SECSTATE MAY 18, 1977

QTE S E C R E T SECTO 4113

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY ONLY

FROM SECRETARY VANCE

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJ: MAY 18 MEETING WITH GROMYKO

1. I HAD A TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR SESSION ON SALT WITH GROMYKO IN WHICH HE SET FORTH A NEW SOVIET POSITION AT SOME LENGTH. IT APPEARS THAT WE ARE AT LEAST TALKING ABOUT SAME GENERAL THREE-PART FRAMEWORK, AND THAT WILL BE BASIS FOR RESUMING MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW MORNING.

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2. GROMYKO LED WITH LONG STATEMENT IN WHICH HE EXPLAINED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD MAKE GENERAL STATEMENTS, EXCHANGE COMMENTS AND THEN, FOR THE SAKE OF PRECISION, COULD EXCHANGE WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. HE THEN DEFENDED AT SOME LENGTH THE REASONS WHY THEY WENT PUBLIC AFTER THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS, SAYING THAT IF THEY HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE "LIGHTNING-LIKE" US STATEMENTS, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUIESCING IN OUR POSITION. HE SAID THAT OUR MOSCOW PROPOSALS WERE ONE-SIDED, AND THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, SO WERE THE IDEAS GIVEN TO DOBRYNIN.

HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ACHIEVEMENTS AT VLADIVOSTOK AND SINCE THEN SHOULD NOT BE CAST ASIDE, BUT THAT WITH MUTUAL GOOD WILL A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO MAKE PROGRESS.

3. AFTER A FAIRLY LENGTHY WIND UP, INCLUDING A REMINDER OF SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN AGREEING TO MIRV COUNTING RULES, HE BAGAN TO COMMENT ON THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE POINTS.

4. ON ALCMS, HE AGAIN CLAIMED THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK, AND THEN REYASHED SOVIET CONCESSION IN AGREEING TO COUNT ALCMS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AS MIRVED, WHICH WAS AMERICAN PORPOSAL THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTENTION OF DEPARTING FROM. THE NEW US IDEA, TO PUT A NUMERICAL CIELING OF 250 HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED WITH ALCMS WAS QUITE UNACCEPTABLE, AND AN EXAMPLE OF THE ONE-SIDED APPROACH HE HAD MENTIONED.

5. ON LAND AND SEA BASED CRUISE MISSILES, AFTER REFER-RING TO THE STANDARD SOVIET PROPOSAL, TO BAN OVER 600 KM, HE SAID THAT THEY DID NOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT A TEMPORARY AGREEMENT BUT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE ALCM QUESTION WAS SOLVED AS THEY PROPOSED, I.E., TO COUNT AS MIRVS.

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6. ON MOVILES, HE RECONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS TO BAN MOBILE LAND-BASED ICBMS, THROUGH 1985, AND HE REPEATED THAT THIS DID NOT AFFECT SS-20, WHICH WAS INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE.

7. ON BACKFIRE, HE REPEATED THAT SOVIETS WERE STILL READY TO GIVE AN ASSURANCE AGAINST INTERCONTINENTAL USE, INCLUDING SPECIFICS OF A RANGE OF CAPABILITY OF 2200 KM, BUT THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT FURTHER PROVI-SIONS, SUCH AS LIMITING BASING, TANKERS, ETC.

8. ON HEAVY ICBMS, GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS ALL SETTLED AT VLADIVOSTOK, AND THAT NEW LIMITS INCLUDING LIMITING THE NUMBER OF HEAVY ICBMS WITH MIRVS COUD NOT BE ACCEPTED.

9. ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL TO BAN FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TESTING OF NEW TYPES OF MISSILES WITH MIRVS (GROMYKO'S FORMULATION), HE SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT, BUT THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF ASPECIFIC TIME PERIOD AND HOW BEST TO FORMULATE THE BAN IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER PROVISIONAL MEASURES.

10. GROMYKO THEN RAN THROUGH THE STANDARD POSITION ON NON-TRANSFER AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND FBS. ON THE LATTER,

HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT THEY WERE PROPOSING TO SOLVE THE FBS QUESTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF VLADIVOSTOK, BUT IT LATER APPEARED THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO PRESS THIS POINT.

11. ON REDUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NEVER REGARDED THE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS AS FINAL, AND THAT HE COULD RECONFIRM THEIR READINESS TO ENTER INTO

NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, AND THAT
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REDUCTIONS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, PROVIDING THERE WAS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL. HE SUMMARIZED THIS BY SAYING FOR NOW IT WAS NECESSARY TO FORMALIZE THE 2400 AND 1320 LEVELS.

12. HE TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF A JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SALT III AND SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ELABORATE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SLOW DOWN THE WORK FOR SALT II. HE SAID THEIR VIEW WAS THAT THIS JOINT STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THE STATEMENT COULD BE ISSUED AT THE TIME OF SIGNING. HE SAID THAT AMONG THE SUBJECT TO BE ADDRESSED WERE QUESTIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ALREADY IDENTIFIED, THAT IS FBS, AND HE CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO THIS STATEMENT. HE ENDED THIS PRESENTATION, WHICH FOR THE MOST PART HE HAD READ FROM A TEXT, BY SAYING THAT ALL ELEMENTS WERE INTERRELATED BUT THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO DEFINE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE "BALANCE OF INTERESTS."

13. I BEGAN MY RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT AND COMMENT ON SOME OF THE ITEMS HE HAD MENTIONED, BUT WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SPEAK IN FURTHER DETAIL AT THE NEXT SESSION. I SAID I WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT WE HAD NOT MADE A NEW PROPOSAL, A PHRASE WHICH HE HAD USED, BUT THAT WE HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN AN EXCHANGE OF THOUGHTS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, THAT WE WERE SERIOUS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND BELIEVED THAT THE PROCESS WOULD HAVE TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET. ACCORDINGLY THERE MUST BE NOT ONLY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BUT A WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN
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TO THE VIEWS OF OTHERS WITH FLEXIBILITY, RATHER THAN STAND ON RIGID POSITIONS. I TOOK UP HIS CRITICISM OF OUR PROPOSALS IN MOSCOW AND SAID OUR OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THE VLADIVOSTOK ISSUES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OPEN UP A MORE MEANINGFUL ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT IN SALT III. THUS, WE WERE NOT REJECTING VLADIVOSTOK, BUT INCORPORATING IT INTO A LARGER WHOLE WITHOUT AN INTERMISSION BETWEEN SALT II AND SALT III. I SAID WE BELIEVED IT WAS NOT IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST TO SIMPLY SAY "NO," AS THEY HAD DONE IN MOSCOW. THEREFORE, SINCE THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR APPROACHES TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND FIND A ROAD THAT WOULD LEAD FROM SALT II TO SALT III. I SAID OUR OBJECTIVE IN THESE MEETINGS HERE IN GENEVA WAS TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON SUCH A FRAMEWORK. THE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS WERE MUCH HIGHER THAN EITHER SIDE NEEDED, AND THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT WOULD NOT CONTROL TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION OR ADDRESS THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF ICBM VULNERABILITY. THUS, UNLESS WE TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS NOW, TECHNOLOGY WOULD OUTSTRIP THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. THEREFORE, I WANTED TO OUTLINE A THREE-PART FRAMEWORK FOR HIS CONSIDERATION. FIRST, A TREATY THAT WOULD BE VALID TO 1985; SECOND, AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR SAY TWO YEARS; AND, THIRD, A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SALT III TO BE SIGNED BY THE PARTIES. THE TREATY WOULD CODIFY THOSE ASPECTS OF VLADIVOSTOK CONCERNING WHICH BOTH SIDES WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN POINTS THAT WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN A PRELIMINARY WAY WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, AND THE STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES WOULD COMMIT BOTH SIDES TO THE KIND OF REDUCTIONS AND DECREASING RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT BOTH SIDES HAD ESPOUSED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.

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15. I THEN TURNED TO SOME SPECIFICS. ON AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, I NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT IN VLADIVOSTOK AND THE PROPOSAL TO COUNT ALCMS AS MIRVS WAS PART OF A PACKAGE CONDITIONAL ON BACKFIRE LIMITATIONS WHICH WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE. ON HEAVY ICBMS, I SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE COULD PROPOSE SOLUTIONS TO CRUISE MISSILES THAT WERE NOT EVEN ADDRESSED IN VLADIVOSTOK, THEN IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE FOR US TO SUGGEST LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY MISSILES. ON FBS, I SAID THAT OUR POSITION HAD LONG BEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SALT, AND IF THEY WERE BROUGHT WITHIN SALT, THIS WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES, SUCH AS BACKFIRE AND SS-20, AS

WELL AS MAKING IT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE OTHER COUNTRIES.

16. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT DESPITE THE FOREGOING DIFFERENCES, I NOTED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME COMMON GROUND. IT APPEARED THAT BOTH SIDES AGREE THERE SHOULD BE A NEW TREATY WHICH WOULD RUN UNTIL 1985, THAT GROMYKO HAD INDICATED HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT A PROVISIONAL, OR INTERIM, AGREEMENT, AND THAT IN PRINCIPLE GROMYKO WAS ALSO PREPARED TO TRY AND REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON BASIC PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN SALT III. GROMYKO INTERRUPTED TO SAY "SOME" PRINCIPLES.

17. I CONTINUED BY SAYING WHERE WE DIFFERED WAS OVER WHAT WAS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES AND THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE THIS DISCUSSION TOMORROW, IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK. GROMYKO SAID HE AGREED WITH THAT PROCEDURE AND THE MEETING ENDED WITH A SHORT DISCUSSION OF WHAT TO SAY TO THE PRESS, WITH GROMYKO PROPOSING THAT WE SAY WE WERE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH A NEW AGREEMENT.

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18. COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT GROMYKO HAS ACCEPTED THE E-PART FRAMEWORK AND SEEMS READY TO GO INTO A FAIRLY INTENSIVE DISCUSSION. OF COURSE, WE ARE FAR APART ON THE SUBSTANCE, BUT HIS POINTED REFERENCE TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS MAKES ME THINK THAT HE MAY WANT TO BEGIN A BARGAINING PHASE. TOMMORROW MORNING, I PLAN TO GO INTO A PROCESS IN WHICH WE SET DOWN OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS MORE OR LESS SIDE-BY-SIDE AND PROBE FOR ANY FURTHER SOVIET FLEXIBILITIES. UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED THAT PHASE, I DO NOT PLAN TO PUT DOWN ANYTHING IN WRITING. VANCE UNWTE CHRISTOPHER

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